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Critical risk scholarship tells a story of changing governmental 
practices of risk management in liberal societies. I take up this 
narrative and weave it together with recent Australian Indigenous 
policy initiatives, in order to present these as state attempts to 
manage Indigenous political difference. Risk management is usually 
understood as a governmental tool to regulate the behaviour of 
individual citizens, however the concept can also be used to reflect 
upon the actions of political authorities attempting to bring themselves 
into being and secure this being through time. I suggest that 
sovereign risk and colonial risk are useful categories to articulate the 
constant challenges posed to a settler colonial state by the ongoing 
existence of independent Indigenous political life. The three recent 
phases of Australian federal Indigenous policy—self-determination, 
neoliberal contractualism and coercive intervention—can be thought 
of as different strategies used by the state to imagine and manage 
this persistent risk. Self-determination is an attempt to socialise 
colonial risk and distribute it throughout the national body, while 
neoliberal contractualism asserts the unsustainability of such a 
collective colonial burden and the need to divest it onto capable 
Indigenous subjects. As contractualism gives way to intervention, 
Indigenous people are framed as unwilling or incapable of moderating 
the burden of risk they pose to themselves and others. The Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) presents a vision of 
catastrophic colonial risk which threatens us all, and which can only 
be secured by unilateral and unconfined settler sovereignty.  
  
Federal Australian Indigenous policy is characterised by a ‘cycle of 
crisis and reinvention’ and by rhetoric of transformative change (Brigg 
2007, p. 415). The past ten years have seen the end of self-
determination policy and the formal reconciliation process, the shift to 
quasi-contractual Shared Responsibility Agreements and bureaucratic 
‘New Arrangements’, the dramatic move to intensive intervention in 
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remote Aboriginal communities, and the current focus on ‘Closing the 
Gap’ in material disadvantage. Policy analysts struggle to keep up, 
and even critical work tends to reproduce the government discourse 
which presents each new phase as a radical break with previous 
policy (V. Watson 2005; 2009). This obscures significant continuities 
in the policy relationships between Indigenous people and settler state 
agencies, and the continuing presence of that state itself in 
Indigenous lives. This article connects the changes in Indigenous 
policy to broader developments in liberal policy making, to show how 
existing strategies of government are taken up and transformed by the 
complex circumstances of settler colonial policy making.  
Recent Australian Indigenous policy making can be separated into 
three phases each characterised by a particular political logic: self-
determination, neoliberalism and intervention. These three phases 
echo broader policy shifts from social welfarism to neoliberal 
contractualism and more recently, to hierarchical and coercive 
‘exceptionalism’ (Neal 2006). What is important in this context is the 
movement between these policy phases and logics, and the way they 
form a connected narrative of shifting practices of liberal political rule 
rather than a series of single policy episodes. While others have 
linked particular Indigenous policies to a particular liberal logic (for 
example, Tedmanson & Wadiwel (2010), Perera (ed.) (2007) and 
Manderson (2008) link the NTER to exceptionalism, and Stringer 
(2007) connects it to neoliberal economic logic), none have traced 
these patterns of change. Doing so has the important political effect of 
making the settler state visible as an ongoing and always incomplete 
project that mobilises multiple policy strategies to deal with Indigenous 
difference.  
The account of Australian Indigenous policy presented here is 
anchored to the theme of political risk management. Post-Foucauldian 
scholars have shown that conceptualisations of risk and technologies 
of risk management are central to liberal governmental rule (O’Malley 
2009; Donzelot 1991; Ewald 1991; Culpitt 1999; Power 2007). The 
way risk is conceptualised by governmental agents and is collected 
and distributed throughout the body politic is a major part of policy 
systems which regulate contemporary social life. These practices shift 
together with broader policy paradigm changes; critical scholars have 
mapped the way that risk management is practiced differently within 
welfarist, neoliberal and exceptionalist policy frameworks. Each 
framework maintains a strong focus on calculating and mitigating risk, 
but deploys different strategies for its allocation amongst individuals, 
collectivities and institutions. I take up this theoretical narrative and 
connect it to the changes in Australian Indigenous policy over the past 
decade, to reveal the ways that this policy operates as an attempt to 
define and manage the ongoing ‘risk’ posed to the settler polity by 
Indigenous political life. Doing so stretches the concept of risk 
management and identifies the new category of colonial risk as a 
subset of sovereign risk.  
border lands 11:1  
3 
 
Risk is generally considered to be an abstract, generalised and 
exchangeable phenomenon (Ewald 1991). Yet the attempt to 
neutralise risk, and distinguish it from a concrete harm that might 
befall a particular agent, is itself a process of government which works 
to enroll others in the protection of specific interests. What constitutes 
harm to one might not be damaging to another—it might even be to 
their advantage or a condition of their existence. When harm is 
detached from the subject who potentially experiences it, others might 
be persuaded or compelled to assume the management of this risk as 
their own responsibility. It is from this perspective that we can usefully 
imagine sovereign risk. Currently the phrase is used to specify the 
potential harms to capital investment that come from sovereign 
actions (Bremmer 2007). In this article, however, it is used to denote 
the risks to state sovereignty from various sources, and the attempt to 
calculate and manage these through public policy. One form of 
sovereign risk is colonial risk.  
Colonialism brings with it a specific set of challenges for the settler 
state attempting to construct and naturalise its sovereignty in a new 
space (Moreton-Robinson 2007; 2009), and these challenges have 
unique temporal dimensions. A settler colonial project always involves 
a ‘start’, but it is equally characterised by the attempt to create an 
‘end’, and to dissolve (on its own terms) the problematic relations 
between coloniser and colonised (Veracini 2007; 2010; Strakosch & 
Macoun 2012). Such polities are both beset by an ongoing and partly 
predictable set of risks, and continually engaged in the attempt to 
transform an unstable present into a newly certain or at least 
calculable political future. The attempt to manage the future is 
therefore common to both risk management and settler colonial 
politics, and a useful story emerges when the heuristic concept of 
‘colonial risk’ is applied to the last decade of Australian Indigenous 
policy. In this story, the past decade of rapid policy change constitutes 
a series of shifting but interrelated strategies to manage the 
uncertainty created by persistent Indigenous independence. To refer 
to colonising strategies is not to posit a coherent settler plan to erase 
Indigenous life, or a ‘hegemonic project of domination’ (Moses 2011, 
p. 9; Schaap & Muldoon 2012). Instead, it is to make the much more 
limited claim that settler authorities, like all governmental agents in 
liberal societies, are engaged in a constantly failing attempt to name 
and to master the complexity, unpredictability and elusive autonomy 
of the world that surrounds them.  
This three part article begins with a short account of the value of 
settler colonial theory, and its ethical and political effects. The second 
section gives an overview of liberal risk management in social welfare, 
neoliberal and exceptionalist policy frameworks. It goes on to draw out 
the sovereign aspects of these practices, which are usually imagined 
as diffuse governmental technologies. The final part brings together 
these narratives of settler colonialism and risk management, to 
present the three recent phases of Australian federal Indigenous 
policy as overlapping strategies to imagine and manage persistent 
colonial risk. Self-determination is an attempt to socialise colonial risk 
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and distribute it throughout the national body, while neoliberal 
contractualism asserts the unsustainability of such a collective 
colonial burden and the need to divest it onto capable Indigenous 
subjects. As contractualism gives way to intervention, Indigenous 
people are framed as unwilling or incapable of moderating the risk 
burden they pose to themselves and others. The NTER presents a 
vision of catastrophic colonial risk which threatens us all, and which 
can only be secured by unilateral and unconfined settler sovereignty.  
The Settler Colonial Story 
Political theorists increasingly recognise that: 
political discourse relies extensively on narrative patterns. This is 
partly the result of the human tendency to rely on narrative as a 
way of understanding the world and endowing it with meaning… as 
Hardy (1987:1) claims “We dream in narrative, daydream in 
narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, 
plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by 
narrative”. (Shenhav 2006, p. 246)  
Interestingly, however, academic work is usually excluded from this 
human process, and imagined as a tool for reflecting upon narratives 
rather than as a species of narrative production itself. In different 
ways, political scholars Tully (2004), Brown (2005) and Brigg (2005) 
challenge this privilege, and present political theory as a practice of 
storytelling that makes visible certain aspects of reality and hides 
others. Like all forms of narrativisation, academic stories linguistically 
condense the world by identifying key causes, actors and inciting 
incidents. They also organise events into meaningful temporal 
progressions of setup, conflict, climax and resolution. Theoretical 
narratives about our political present may be more or less powerful 
and resonant, and may seem to adhere more or less well to the 
material world and our personal experience of it. Nonetheless, they 
remain (often unpredictable and always incomplete) ways of 
organising a complex reality which cannot claim an epistemological 
status above other forms of meaning production (Brigg 2005, pp. 144-
51). Viewing academic work as a form of storytelling is liberating in 
some ways, but pushes us to make new and more explicit demands of 
our work. Instead of asking ‘what is the correct theoretical 
framework?’, Tully suggests that we should instead consider, ‘what 
comparative difference does it make to study politics this way rather 
than that way?’ (2004, p. 80). Particular theories foreground different 
aspects of reality, and enact or contest existing political relationships. 
Therefore, our political commitments simultaneously emerge through 
the stories we tell about political relationships and drive us towards 
stories which serve those commitments. In telling the story of 
contemporary Indigenous policy as a story of risk management, I am 
looking for ways to disturb rather than to naturalise the problematic 
relations of settler colonialism.  
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As a theoretical narrative with ‘immediate explanatory power’, the 
settler colonial framework is increasingly gaining traction in non-
Indigenous historical, legal and political scholarship (McHugh & Ford 
forthcoming; Schaap & Muldoon 2012). As articulated by Veracini 
(2007; 2010; 2011) and Wolfe (1999; 2006; 2008), settler colonialism 
is a set of political relationships which continues to structure the 
Australian state’s relationship with Indigenous peoples and to obscure 
this structuring. It is distinct from postcolonialism, which refers to 
those large sections of the world which have undergone formal 
decolonisation by European powers and now face highly mediated 
global systems of imperial control (Shohat 1992; Hall 1996; Stringer 
2007, p. 3). However, academic colonial theory is dominated by 
scholars from postcolonial contexts, leading to ‘an oddly monolithic, 
and surprisingly unexamined, notion of colonialism’ that operates 
problematically in relation to Australia (Wolfe 1999, p. 1). 
Postcolonialism assumes a moment of transformative restructuring 
which has not occurred in settler polities. This locates the event of 
colonisation in the past and assumes that now policy must deal with 
its ‘legacies’, ‘heritage’, ‘trauma’ or ‘reverberative aftermath’ (this 
language is powerfully present in Australian political scholarship, for 
examples see Moses (2011); Stringer (2007); Lawrence & Gibson 
(2007)). In contrast, the analytical categories of settler colonial theory 
are driving many scholars to articulate Australian colonisation in 
contemporary terms. In this sense, the framework resonates with 
existing Indigenous critical work which points to the fact that 
‘colonisation has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from 
that which our ancestors encountered’ (Moreton-Robinson 2009a, p. 
11). 
Wolfe identifies settler colonialism as operating through the ‘logic of 
elimination’. Settlers aim to replace Indigenous peoples on their land, 
not to simply exploit natural resources or extract surplus value from 
Indigenous labour (1999, p. 163). This means that ‘all the Indigenous 
person needs to do to get in the way of the settler colonial project is to 
stay at home’ (Deborah Bird Rose in Wolfe 1999, p. 388). Elimination 
can be physical, but need not be—it can also involve eliminating 
officially recognised Aboriginal people through ‘blood quotas’, or 
assimilating them into white society in ways that sever connections to 
their Aboriginality (Alfred 1999). It can also involve sophisticated 
practices of political absorption through self-determination and treaty 
(Murphy 2000; Strakosch & Macoun 2012). The concept of the logic of 
elimination resonates with Indigenous observations regarding the 
particular disregard to which Aboriginal peoples have been subject in 
Australia. Sheehan claims that (contra postcolonial theory) Aborigines 
have not been positioned as ‘the other’ but as ‘the non-other’ (2008); 
Irene Watson points to the continual ‘negation of Aboriginal identity’ 
(2009); Murphy identifies all Australian social policy as ‘terra nullius 
social policy’ because ‘it operates from a premise of non-recognition’ 
(2000, p. 6). Settler colonial theory highlights the powerful political 
forces which constantly pull settler policy making and scholarship 
back towards the denial of Aboriginal existence. While multiple factors 
determine individual policy episodes and there are many spaces of 
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resistance and political possibility, the logic of elimination runs as a 
thread through both progressive and conservative approaches.  
Settler colonialism is itself an academic narrative and the challenge as 
non-Indigenous scholars is to remain attentive to its entangled 
assumptions and effects. These effects are not automatically 
transformative (Sovereign 2011)1; by positing a structural inevitability 
to the colonial relationship the theory can shut down space for political 
action. It also projects the image of a rational, agential settler state 
intent on pursuing its own interests, and therefore tends to present 
settler sovereignty as a completed project rather than a contested set 
of practices. This elides the messy failures and compromises which 
are present in every field of policy making. On the other hand, the 
framework holds a great deal of potential for exposing and fracturing 
the political relationships it describes. It exposes the settler side of the 
colonial relationship and therefore makes profound political and 
ethical demands upon non-Indigenous scholars. The most significant 
of these is that we turn away from the constant interrogation of 
Aboriginal life towards our own emotional, academic and political 
participation in the settler colonial relationship.  
My own narrative of colonial risk management responds to this 
demand, while seeking to remain attentive to the messy and 
contingent realities of policymaking. Settler sovereignty takes its place 
as a character in this political story, rather than disappearing into the 
background as a neutral frame (this follows the work of Muldoon 
(2008), Moreton-Robinson (2009b) and I. Watson (2009)). Secondly, it 
contests the colonial autobiography of sovereign completion (Scott 
1995). By fracturing the projected image of rational colonial actor, and 
highlighting the conflicts and failures of policy making, I contest the 
automatic assumption that the state already exists in a completed 
form. This in turn refuses to accept colonisation as a fait accompli, 
and makes space for the ongoing existence of Indigenous political 
difference. Non-Indigenous scholar Moses suggests in relation to 
Indigenous critical scholarship that ‘a political strategy is not 
necessarily a sound theory’ (2011, p. 26). Yet, in the settler colonial 
context where knowledge is profoundly implicated in political relations, 
this defense is not sufficient (Moreton-Robinson 2004). Instead of 
focusing on Indigenous thought as a form of political strategy, we 
must recognise our own as such and take responsibility for its effects.  




Risk Management and Social Policy 
“Risk” is a four-letter word that inspires a lot of action in the modern 
world. Risk identification and risk management are now huge 
industries that are generating, as well as attempting to save, 
billions of dollars … today risk structures both the approach of 
experts to natural disasters and activities and aspects of everyday 
living. Our safety, healthcare, education, finances and even our 
personal relationships are all seen through a risk filter… Our public 
sectors are turning to risk paradigms to understand and recalculate 
how public programs are developed and implemented. (Althaus 
2008, p. 11) 
Risk and its management is an ongoing liberal preoccupation. 
Capitalism functions via private risk-taking, but such routine 
adventurism only becomes possible when insulated by technologies 
of risk calculation and insurance (Donzelot 1991). Governmentality 
scholars argue that risk technology is also central to the liberal project 
of governing through independent activity (Donzelot 1991; Culpitt 
1999). Insurance technology acts as a mechanism to bind subjects 
together into a society without creating substantive bonds, and 
therefore practically enables liberal individualisation (Ewald 1991, pp. 
203-4). ‘Insurance provides a form of association which combines a 
maximum of socialization with a maximum of individualization… It 
seems to reconcile those two antagonists, society-socialization and 
individual liberty’ (Ewald 1991, p. 204).  
Risk is calculable using the techniques of the statistician and the 
actuary, is collective in the sense that its probabilities are spread 
across populations, and is a capital that can be assigned a monetary 
value (O’Malley 2009; Power 2007). This last feature is key: ‘[o]ne and 
the same event acquires a dual status: on the one hand, a happening 
with the uniqueness of the irreparable; on the other, an indemnifiable 
risk’ (Ewald 1991, p. 204). Risk refers to only one aspect of a real 
harm—the aspect that is calculable and compensatable. As a political 
technology: 
The term designates neither an event nor a general kind of event 
occurring in reality (the unfortunate kind), but a specific mode of 
treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of 
individuals—or, more exactly, to values or capitals possessed or 
represented by a collectivity of individuals… Nothing is a risk in 
itself; there is no risk in reality. But, on the other hand, anything can 
be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers 
the event. (Ewald 1991, p. 199) 
While risk remains a key liberal technology, its conceptualisation and 
application shifts. This section briefly outlines the social democratic 
philosophy of collective risk management, and the neoliberal attempt 
to divest this risk in the name of global competitiveness. It then goes 
on to introduce new work on ‘post-neoliberal’ catastrophic risk, and 
corresponding practices of strategic intervention. It is problematic to 
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separate these policy approaches into discrete, homogenous epochs, 
or to suggest that they naturally succeed one another (Larner 2000; 
MacDonald & Muldoon 2006, p. 209). However, they are useful 
heuristic categories and their sequential ordering is important. Each 
builds upon and transforms previous approaches.  
Beginning in nineteenth century workplaces, faultless collective risk 
management moves outwards to structure the entire field of citizen-
state interaction (Donzelot 1991; Ewald 1991; Gordon 1991; Castel 
1991). The mid-twentieth century welfare state functions by 
collectivising risk and compensating individuals for injuries suffered as 
part of the ‘common venture of society’ (Gordon 1991, p. 39). Social 
insurance spreads risk evenly across a population rather than 
allowing it to remain concentrated in particular sectors. By 
collectivising risk in this way it effects substantive changes in ethical 
life; disadvantage and unemployment become detached from 
individual actions and acquire the quality of accident. Social welfare 
constitutes:  
a philosophy of civil law as the redistribution of social risk, rather 
than the retribution of private culpability, and a novel notion of 
faultless civil responsibility… The concept of social risk makes it 
possible for insurance technologies to be applied to social 
problems in a way which can be presented as creative 
simultaneously of social justice and social solidarity. (Gordon 1991, 
pp. 39-40)  
Social welfare deploys legislation and administrative regulation to 
prevent overly risky private interaction, and therefore proceeds by 
‘enlarging the sphere of the statutory at the expense of the 
contractual’ (Donzelot quoted in Gordon 1991, p. 40).  
The rise of neoliberal logics in the second half of the twentieth century 
halts this state risk accrual, and ‘the shift from contract to status in 
social welfare relations begins to go into reverse’ (Gordon 1991, p. 45; 
Culpitt 1999). Neoliberalism questions the state’s ability to carry the 
entire burden of social risk in emerging conditions of global economic 
insecurity and bitter competition (Hindess 1998; Donzelot 1991, p. 
270). Therefore, it mobilises a sense of sovereign risk—the idea that 
the state could potentially be submerged—as a justification to begin 
the process of divesting risk back onto individual citizens. 
Neoliberalism ‘shifts the emphasis from the principle of collective 
indemnification of ills and injuries attended on life in society, towards a 
greater stress on the individual’s civic obligation to moderate the 
burden of risk which he or she imposes on society’ (Gordon 1991, p. 
45). Collectivised social risk is presented not just as unsustainable, 
but as ineffective. By sidelining personal responsibility, political rule 
can no longer mobilise subjects’ own resources to manage their lives 
and reduce their individual risk (Donzelot 1991, p. 273). Thus, 
according to neoliberalism, social welfare policies increase the overall 
burden of risk and compound the danger of sovereign collapse.  
border lands 11:1  
9 
 
Contract reappears as a productive mechanism to specify each 
individual’s responsibilities. Unitary ‘faultless’ risk disaggregates, and 
reattaches to its particular assumed conditions. Many scholars identify 
the ethical transformations which accompany this neoliberal 
divestment (McClelland 2002; Carney & Ramia 2001; Yeatman 1997). 
It involves ‘the re-emergence of a moral discourse of welfare that is 
almost totally pejorative… [and] an increasingly strident attack on 
welfare dependency, and the imputation of ‘social’ risk this entails’ 
(Culpitt 1999, p. 1). This ‘new prudentialism’ erodes the subordinate 
but morally protected status of dependency and positions individuals 
as responsible for their own circumstances (Yeatman 1998; Dean 
1999, p. 166). Appropriately self-regulating subjects should be able to 
absorb accidents by planning their own future and moderating their 
own risk:  
it means no longer resigning oneself to the decrees of providence 
and the blows of fate, but instead transforming one’s relationships 
with nature, the world and God so that, even in misfortune, one 
retains responsibility for one’s affairs by possessing the means to 
repair its effects. (Ewald 1991, p. 207) 
While this form of neoliberalism remains influential, Dean suggests 
that we have entered a new era of authoritarian liberalism (2007). This 
phase is characterised by a ‘creeping extension of emergency powers 
enunciated in the vocabulary of emergency, necessity, crisis’ and a 
new willingness to apply coercive, pre-emptive techniques to whole 
population categories (Dean 2007, pp. 191-4; see also Henman 2004; 
Tosa 2009). This phase of ‘exceptionalism’ is accompanied by 
changing narratives of the manageability of risk. There is a growing 
perception, articulated by sociological scholar Ulrich Beck, ‘that risk 
might in fact be increasing due to technology, science and 
industrialism rather than being abated by scientific and technological 
progress’ (Beck in Jarvis 2007, p. 23). New global threats such as 
terrorism, climate change and epidemic disease cannot be predicted 
and the scale of their effects cannot be known in advance. They are 
delocalised, omnipresent, incalculable and uncompensatable (Beck 
2008, pp. 27-8).2  
Because of this shifting understanding of contemporary risk, 
‘traditional technologies of risk assessment, management and 
insurance are no longer fully functional’ and ‘the logic of 
compensation is breaking down and is being replaced by the principle 
of precaution through prevention’ (Beck 2008, p. 5). Where before 
insurance technology and science imagined the world to be potentially 
fully calculable, this new risk perception suggests that there will 
always be events which cannot be foreseen or managed. ‘World risk 
society is confronted with the awkward problem of having to make 
decisions about life and death and war and peace on the basis of a 
more or less frank lack of knowledge’ (Beck 2008, p. 6). Given this 
lack, risk management increasingly proceeds via preventative 
interventions according to predictive categories. Comprehensive 
measures are applied to ‘at risk’ groups, typified by racial profiling at 
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airport checkpoints (Henman 2004). In response to catastrophic 
events, ‘[t]he precautionary principle requires an active use of doubt… 
Before any action, I must not only ask myself what I need to know and 
what I need to master, but also what I do not know, what I dread or 
suspect’ (Ewald 2002, p. 285). Therefore, the mobilisation of fear, 
suspicion and hysteria are governmental imperatives, part of the 
necessary process of managing unmanageable risks (Beck 2008, pp. 
6-7).  
Sociological and governmental accounts tend to naturalise or elide the 
causes of changing risk practices.3 However, I suggest that the 
contemporary rise of incalculable risk is closely linked to the earlier 
social- and neo-liberal development of risk calculation technologies. 
The careful attempt to regulate the future via risk technology itself 
leads to the creation of a ‘too hard’ category of exceptional events 
which cannot be insured. Rather than being outside governmental 
regulation, catastrophic risk is a governmental class which flags the 
high probability that management measures will fail, and demands 
that subjects prepare themselves for potentially devastating 
outcomes. To some degree, this insulates governing institutions from 
this failure and therefore forms one part of a comprehensive risk 
management strategy. To frame this in policy terms, governmental 
agencies’ increasingly detailed specification of policy goals and 
constant evaluation of progress give rise to a category of things which 
come to be called ‘wicked policy problems’ (APSC 2007; MAC 2004). 
Wicked problems pose exceptionally high risks to governments, 
because they cannot be known in advance and are resistant to 
intervention. As policy agencies note, ‘[a]ttempts to address wicked 
problems often lead to unforeseen consequences… Wicked problems 
are often not stable’ (APSC 2007, p. 4). As with catastrophic risk, it is 
important to consider the governmental functions of the wicked 
problem category, including how it might work to insulate Government 
against failure and legitimise exceptional action. As the Australian 
Public Service best practice guide notes: ‘[i]t should be acknowledged 
that in some circumstances the use of authoritative or competitive 
strategies may be useful to agencies tasked with tackling a wicked 
problem’ (APSC 2007, pp. 9-10). Overall, rather than being an 
unconditioned ‘eruption’, catastrophic risk forms part of the shifting 
practice of liberal risk management.  
Sovereign Risk  
Risk is usually understood as a diffuse governmental technology, but 
it has important sovereign effects. In different ways, social liberal, 
neoliberal and exceptionalist risk practices act to construct state 
sovereignty and secure its existence through time. In social 
democratic risk practice, the state is presented as the sole actor 
capable of assuming social risk. In neoliberal and exceptionalist 
practices, the state becomes visible as subject to its own economic 
and political vulnerabilities, as well as retaining its unique capacity to 
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secure pockets of high social risk. Sovereign risk therefore assumes 
increasing significance in neoliberal and exceptionalist policy making.   
In wider usage, ‘risk’ suggests ‘danger’ and the presence of an 
objective threat. As a political technology, however, risk is a neutral 
category (Castel 1991; Ewald 1991, p. 199). Rather than being a 
measure of what is bad, it assesses what is uncertain and potentially 
harmful to a particular set of interests. A good example of the partisan 
nature of risk is the calculation of political risk tables. The phrase 
‘political risk’ is increasingly being used by financial and consulting 
agencies to specify the chances that political events will impact 
negatively upon international investments in a particular country: ‘for 
investors, political risk can simply be defined as the risk of losing 
money due to changes that occur in a country’s government or 
regulatory environment’ (Christy 2011). A number of these agencies 
offer quantitative rankings of political risk and advice for corporations 
undertaking their own assessments prior to overseas investment. 
Such risk calculations do not evaluate the freedom, openness or 
justice of a national political system. They are concerned only with the 
likelihood that the system will change with negative consequences for 
capital. Thus well-established authoritarian regimes are often low risk 
investment environments. As one leading political risk assessor notes: 
‘[s]ome countries are stable because they are open. Others remain 
stable only so long as they are closed’ (Bremmer 2007).  
This example raises two key points. Firstly, it shows that risk is 
inherently linked to a particular set of interests. What is calculated as 
a risk by one subject (for example, the risk to capital that an 
oppressive regime will fall) does not necessarily constitute a risk for 
others (for example, the subjects of that regime). These others might 
keenly desire the future event or require it as part of their ongoing 
survival. From this perspective it is meaningful to imagine sovereign 
risk as the collection of future circumstances which would destabilise 
the ongoing existence of a state. These circumstances are not always 
inherently negative and some may experience them as profoundly 
liberating. Nonetheless they would erode the ongoing attempt to 
construct and naturalise the existence of a particular territorial 
sovereign. The second point to take from the example is the fact that 
risk calculations are already being aggregated to the levels of states 
and sovereignties. While speaking of colonial risk at first seems 
impossibly abstract, in other circles this kind of calculation is already 
taking place. The phrase ‘sovereign risk’ is itself used by the finance 
sector, and was frequently heard during recent Australian climate 
change policy debates (Fitzgerald 2011; Murdoch & Moran 2010). 
This article, however, inverts its established meaning. Rather than 
indicating the risk that comes from sovereignty to capital investment, it 
is used to refer to the risks to sovereignty from other sources.  
These sovereign risks are diverse and profound. They include obvious 
transformative political events such as revolutions, invasions and 
secessions alongside more gradual processes like slowing economic 
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growth, international condemnation and regional instability. The 
concept can also be extended to include the many cultural, social and 
political practices which challenge the sovereign assertion of absolute 
authority over a territory. Ferguson and Gupta note that, while many 
scholars are comfortable with the idea of the nation as a project of 
political imagination, few challenge the image of the natural and 
completed state (2005, p. 105). Rather than objective facts, they 
suggest that states are:  
powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are 
themselves always culturally represented and understood in 
particular ways. It is here that it becomes possible to speak of 
states, and not only nations… as “imagined”, that is, as constructed 
entities that are conceptualised and made socially effective through 
particular imaginative and symbolic devices. (Ferguson & Gupta 
2005, p. 105)  
The ‘vertically encompassing’, unified state is itself an incomplete 
political project, by which contingent and constructed political 
institutions seek ‘to secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their 
authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and 
encompassing of, other institutions and centres of power’ (Ferguson & 
Gupta 2005, p. 106). The naturalisation of this narrative is undermined 
by practices that expose the limitations of government authority, the 
existence of alternative forms of political regulation or the priority of 
other cultural identities. Sovereign risk management is the attempt to 
identify, predict and limit the impact of these diverse disruptive 
practices.  
The category of sovereign risk is useful in that it leads us to recognise 
the vulnerability and incompleteness of the state. It is also useful in its 
resonance with contemporary liberal policy logics. The state positions 
itself both inside and outside risk management practices as part of 
social democratic, neoliberal and exceptionalist policy. In the social 
liberal framework, the state itself is not subject to risk but stands as 
invulnerable social guarantor. Although this framework superficially 
erases sovereign imperatives, it nonetheless gives rise to particular 
justifications for the continued existence of state institutions. Only the 
state can underwrite social insurance:  
if the state is the only institution within society possessed of that 
degree of solidity requisite in a provider of certain kinds of 
insurance, it then follows that the continued survival of the state will 
itself become a peculiarly social imperative. The existence of 
insurance is… an insurance against revolution. (Gordon 1991, pp. 
40-41) 
As a guarantor of social risk, the state requires ‘quasi-infinite 
longevity’ in order to insure future events: 
With insurance one comes to experience a sort of dilation of 
timescales, stretched out to span not just one generation or lifetime 
but several, and thus positing the survival of society for an 
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indefinite future… In guaranteeing security, the state is equally 
guaranteeing itself its own existence, maintenance, permanence. 
(Ewald 1991, p. 209)    
The state erases its own sovereign vulnerabilities (in itself an act of 
sovereign construction) but still uses risk technology in ways that 
secure its authority.  
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, asserts the vulnerability of the state 
rather than projecting a permanent, necessary sovereignty. It presents 
the collective social risk burden carried by the welfare state as 
unsustainable in conditions of global economic competition (Hindess 
1998). Therefore, the state is characterised as subject to risk rather 
than as regulating it. Most importantly, neoliberalism seeks to enroll 
individuals in the protection of the state by demanding that they carry 
their own risk burdens. Thus it erases the partisan nature of sovereign 
risk by universalising it and divesting it to citizens. Neoliberalism 
further endorses the unique role of sovereign states by positioning 
them as essential partners in the project of regulating life. Gordon 
suggests that neoliberal states locate themselves as ‘custodians of a 
collective reality-principle, distributing the disciplines of the 
competitive world market throughout the interstices of the social body’ 
(Gordon 1991, p. 45). States possess unique expertise and capacity 
to discipline subjects unwilling to moderate their own risk.  
Authoritarian liberalism amplifies the neoliberal discourse of sovereign 
anxiety. It extends sites of risk from the economic to the political, 
social, biological and natural realm. Alongside the continued 
neoliberal disaggregation of risk to individuals, ‘exceptionalist’ policy 
regimes identify and act decisively in high risk ‘priority locations’ 
(Senate 2006, p. 13). Many scholars have noted the performance of a 
newly assertive, agential state sovereignty in the face of catastrophic 
risk (Perera (ed.) 2007; Agamben 2005; Beck 2008). However, few 
have traced the ways in which this decisive sovereign is closely 
connected to the vulnerable neoliberal state. When risk is divided into 
calculable and incalculable categories, the former can be returned to 
subjects for self-moderation. This leaves a lean, mobile sovereignty, 
unencumbered by the collective risk burden, operating as ‘the last line 
of defence’ against incalculable communal threats (remembering that 
only the re-individualisation of risk creates this ‘remnant basket’ 
category). The discourse of sovereign vulnerability, which 
characterises neoliberal risk management, continues in authoritarian 
policy. However, the survival of the state becomes more urgent and is 
more directly connected to the physical survival of its members. Only 
the state can act to secure sites of catastrophic communal risk—
whether these risks come from overwhelming natural phenomena, 
transnational religious forces or from domestic populations unable to 
moderate the social risk that they pose to others.   
In summary, social democracy appears to enfold society in 
mechanisms of risk management while neoliberalism and especially 
exceptionalism seek to enfold the sovereign state in such 
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mechanisms. However, the above discussion shows that all forms of 
liberal risk management act to construct and secure state authority. 
Colonial Risk Management in Australian Indigenous Policy 
Sovereign risks are both vague and specific, and can be partially 
calculated according to particular factors. By identifying categories, 
patterns and recurring characteristics, past events can be used to 
predict sovereign risk levels in states with similar features. States 
which are developing, geographically vulnerable to terrorism, prone to 
frequent changes of government, economically uncompetitive, subject 
to the rise of religious fundamentalism and so on, are at greater risk of 
being ineffective or even of ‘failing’ (Tosa 2009).  
Colonial relationships constitute a significant sovereign risk factor. 
Settler colonial states share similar features, such as the persistent 
presence of an Indigenous population identifying as politically 
different. Recurring colonial challenges include international criticism, 
weakened internal legitimacy, difficulty mobilising colonised subjects, 
unpredictable legal decisions, Indigenous re-acquisition of or refusal 
to relinquish traditional land, visible persistent Indigenous 
disadvantage and Aboriginal non-cooperation with policy programs. In 
Australia, it is a well established pattern that Indigenous material 
disadvantage persists despite government attempts to redress it. 
There is a high risk that new policies will fail to shift visible 
disadvantage, and such disadvantage constitutes a ‘wicked policy 
problem’ (APSC 2007). Colonialism also brings recurring challenges 
to the political narrative of state legitimacy. The ongoing presence of 
ungoverned, ungovernable or independent Indigenous subjects 
undermines the settler assertion of absolute territorial authority. 
Settler colonialism projects a moment of sovereign completion which 
is constantly deferred, creating an ongoing gap between the 
imperative of sovereign security and the reality of the present 
(Moreton-Robinson 2009b; Veracini 2010). Again, attempts to close 
this gap through treaty, reconciliation, denial or forcible assimilation 
have failed to erase Indigenous political difference, so the risk that 
new measures will fail is high. In this sense, Indigenous political 
difference also constitutes a wicked problem, resistant to intervention 
over time and unlikely to be successfully resolved in a single policy 
initiative. Over all of these recurring sovereign challenges looms the 
spectre of colonial failure. Although unlikely in the Australian context, 
the comprehensive exposure and dissolution of settler colonial 
projects can occur (as in the case of Algeria; Veracini 2007). This 
adds urgency to the settler colonial project and underlines the 
potential severity of colonial sovereign risk.  
As Ewald argues, ‘Nothing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. 
But, on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how 
one analyzes the danger, considers the event’ (1991, p. 199). The 
nature of colonial risk further highlights the fact that risks are 
constituted in relation to particular agents. Colonial risk is specific to 
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the desires and goals of settler colonial institutions. It is presumably 
not experienced the same way by many Indigenous political 
communities—although they may be intimately connected to the 
settler state and do not necessarily seek its dissolution. By de-
neutralising risk, we observe the colonising functions of recent 
Australian Indigenous policy attempts to manage and redistribute 
colonial risk.  
Reconciliation and Self-determination 
From the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, federal Governments acted 
to establish ‘progressive’ systems of self-management and legislative 
recognition (V. Watson 2004; Murphy 2000; Gibson 1999). The 
centrepiece of this policy regime was the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC). ATSIC operated through an elected 
regional council structure and thus was positioned as an authentic 
Indigenous political voice (Murphy 2000). The self-determination 
approach overlapped with and supported a social ‘reconciliation’ 
agenda, whereby the state aimed to reform mainstream attitudes and 
address past injustices (Gunstone 2007).  
This policy phase is clearly linked to the political rationality of social 
welfarism, which aims to collectivise hardship and to provide state 
remedies to social problems. Indigenous peoples are positioned as 
disadvantaged through collective historical exclusion but deserving of 
full inclusion in the Australian nation-state. It is the responsibility of 
mainstream Governments to enact this inclusion through legislation, 
social welfare and support for limited forms of autonomy (Gibson 
1999). As the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation states, Indigenous 
disadvantage ‘stems directly from colonisation, dispossession from 
their lands and forced marginalisation, depriving them of the rights 
and opportunities taken for granted by other citizens’ (Scott 2000, p. 
5). Thus Indigenous hardships are gathered together by the state and 
transformed into a faultless collective responsibility. More importantly, 
the same process takes place in relation to settler society—no 
particular institutions or individuals are held responsible for the 
circumstances of colonialism. Reconciliation constitutes an attempt to 
collectivise colonial risk and distribute it evenly across the national 
body rather than letting it concentrate in and overwhelm particular 
sectors.  
Only by taking on and insuring individuals against the significant risks 
of confronting colonial conflict can all citizens be encouraged to enter 
upon this difficult task—thus reconciliation is ‘enfolded’ in mechanisms 
of security by the state, who also underwrites political agreements 
made in the present moment and guarantees that they will endure 
through time. The state takes on the risks of future identity change 
and compensation, for example, by legislating native title rather than 
allowing common law resolution and by offering a collective apology. 
It therefore becomes the only institution able to stand above and 
guarantee the process of reconciliation into the future and able to 
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distribute colonial protections throughout the social body. The state 
positions itself outside the play of colonial conflicts, and as neutral 
guarantor of the risks of colonial resolution. Its sovereign 
vulnerabilities are erased and colonialism is framed as a social rather 
than political phenomenon. By taking on the risks of encounter for 
both settler and Indigenous peoples, reconciliation and self-
determination policy constitutes them as an abstract unified society 
engaged upon a ‘common venture’ (Gordon 1991, p. 39).  
Neoliberal Contractualism 
The bipartisan approach to Indigenous self-determination policy 
formed part of a broader Australian ‘civic consensus’ to avoid overtly 
politicising race and immigration issues (Pitty & Leach 2004, p. 96). 
Perhaps because of this consensus, Indigenous affairs remained 
somewhat insulated from the wider Australian shift towards neoliberal 
social policy. However, in 1996 the dramatic rise of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation party fractured this consensus and it became politically 
feasible to contest accepted explanations of racial disadvantage (Jupp 
2004; Pitty & Leach 2004). From this point, the Howard Government 
began using neoliberal arguments to challenge the self-determination 
framework. It rejected the official Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
report and introduced a ‘practical reconciliation’ agenda based on 
addressing material disadvantage rather than social exclusion 
(Gunstone 2008).4 Then, in 2004 it abolished the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission, citing politicisation, corruption and 
policy failure (Howard & Vanstone 2004). This was replaced by ‘New 
Arrangements in Indigenous Affairs’ that were presented as 
consensual, enabling and economically responsible (OIPC 2006). 
Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) and Regional Partnership 
Agreements (RPAs) were at the centre of this new approach. They 
deployed neoliberal quasi-contractual mechanisms in order to reform 
Indigenous capacity and mobilise Indigenous autonomy (Arabena 
2005; Lawrence & Gibson 2007; Strakosch 2009).  
In the new neoliberal narrative of sovereign insecurity, the state 
burden of collective colonial risk is no longer sustainable and 
threatens the whole. The Australian government argues that: 
[t]he [Reconciliation] Council’s draft legislation would impose a 
potentially divisive, protracted (at least 12 years) and inconclusive 
process on the nation… rather than offering closure, pursuit of a 
treaty would be a recipe for ongoing disputation and litigation… The 
Government’s position on a treaty is that such a legally enforceable 
instrument, as between sovereign states would be divisive, would 
undermine the concept of a single Australian nation, would create 
legal uncertainty and future disputation. (Commonwealth 2002, pp. 
19-23) 
More broadly, this period is characterised by the increasing 
prominence of arguments about the unsustainability of Aboriginal 
welfare payments, the sovereign territorial erosions of native title, and 
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the claim that reconciliation causes national divisions by positing and 
therefore creating a colonial social conflict where none exists. Settler 
society can no longer tolerate carrying the burden of colonial risk, 
which ought to be disaggregated and reallocated to particular 
(Aboriginal) sections of the population. Responsibility for addressing 
colonialism should no longer rest with the state:  
The Government believes that a continuing dialogue on the 
unfinished business of reconciliation allowing for negotiated 
outcomes on matters such as rights, self-determination within the 
life of the nation, and constitutional reform should be achieved 
outside the confines of a legislated process. (Commonwealth 2002, 
p. 18)  
As in other forms of neoliberal policy, social democratic attempts to 
generate faultless collective responsibility actually increases the 
overall burden of risk, by insulating individuals from the effects of their 
actions and so encouraging them to act in harmful ways. This is 
reflected in the discourse of ‘passive welfare’ and the negative 
politicising effects of self-determination policy. Aboriginal communities 
are, however, assumed to be capable of assuming their own risk or, at 
least, able to become capable through the process of assuming it. 
Incentivised, circular SRAs, along with other quasi-contractual 
technologies such as Indigenous Land Use Agreements, put the 
social democratic move from contract to status into reverse, divesting 
colonial risk onto Indigenous subjects and specifying Indigenous 
responsibility to the state. However, given that colonial risk belongs to 
the settler state (or alternatively, only exists in the context of settler 
colonial desires/goals), this is a divestment rather than a re-
divestment. Indigenous peoples are being asked to take on 
responsibility for the successful completion of the settler colonial 
project, and to moderate the risk they impose on non-Indigenous 
society.   
Intervention 
Neoliberal SRA policy operated through the public demonstration of 
voluntary consensus. Where successful, this technique created a 
powerful sense of legitimacy and momentum for reform. However, it 
also gave Indigenous communities endless opportunity to refuse their 
consent and cooperation. Comprehensive SRAs and RPAs, which 
involved substantive reform of Indigenous structures for little tangible 
reward, did not generate a great deal of interest. Even progress on 
small scale SRAs, which involved more concrete benefits, was ‘slower 
than expected’ (FaCSIA 2006, p. 237). Government continually set 
itself numerical targets which it failed to meet5 and those agreements 
that were signed often did not function effectively (Morgan Disney et 
al. 2007, pp. 10-11). As these problems became increasingly obvious, 
policy agencies moved towards a language of crisis management.  
Aboriginal people are presented as unexpectedly incapable of 
assuming their own risk and the provisional neoliberal recognition of 
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capacity is withdrawn. When the Senate Estimates Committee 
questions the failures of SRA policy, FaCSIA executives suggest that 
the collaborative approach was destined to fail given Indigenous 
dysfunction: 
FaCSIA Secretary Harmer: it is very difficult to make progress in a 
place like Wadeye, where there was such difficulty in terms of 
street violence, without adequate policing. It was a backdrop— 
Opposition Senator Evans: Do not hide behind that— 
Harmer: No, I am not hiding behind it. It is a fact…  
Opposition Senator Evans: You are responsible for youth 
policy… It fell through the cracks. It did not happen. Don’t you take 
responsibility for that? 
FaCSIA Secretary Harmer: There is not much you can do with the 
youth in Wadeye. (Senate 2006, pp. 27-30) 
Bureaucrats mobilise a strong language of Indigenous default: ‘We 
took a very passive approach, a very generous approach of giving 
without demanding too much, and it was not reciprocated…’ (Gibbons 
in Senate 2006, p. 32). By both refusing to sign agreements, and 
failing to implement those agreements adequately, almost every 
Indigenous community is assigned to the incapable category. Or 
perhaps more accurately, the SRA experiment finds a high incidence 
of incapacity amongst those it deals with, and therefore identifies 
Indigeneity itself as a significant risk factor for governmental 
incapacity. In future Government will act pre-emptively to secure this 
high risk sector. Having divested the mass of Indigenous risk to 
capable subjects outside remote communities, the intervening state 
resumes responsibility for particular high risk pockets of Indigenous 
life. It does so not as a social obligation, but as an act of generosity 
and an attempt to moderate the Indigenous population’s risk to others. 
Those whose risk is resumed have already proved to be incapable, 
and therefore they can be acted upon in unilateral and coercive ways.  
In 2007, the federal Government declared a national emergency in 
remote Aboriginal communities, based on ‘revelations’ of child sexual 
abuse in the Northern Territory (Anderson & Wild 2007). The Northern 
Territory Emergency Response (NTER) again suspended the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), in order to apply a raft of restrictions to 
Indigenous Territory residents (Manderson 2008; Macoun 2011). 
These include welfare management, compulsory health checks, the 
appointment of community administrators, and alcohol and 
pornography bans. The hierarchical exclusions of the NTER echo 
previous protectionist policies while drawing on very contemporary 
practices to manage catastrophic risk (Stringer 2007; Manderson 
2008; Dean 2007). As other scholars have pointed out, the logic of 
exceptionalism resonates strongly with the long term construction of 
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Aboriginal peoples as exceptional and in need of normalisation (Brigg 
2007, p. 404). 
While SRAs addressed the whole Indigenous population, this 
approach singles out particularly vulnerable or high risk sub-groups 
(Senate 2006, p. 23). It is aimed at pockets of dysfunction, while 
‘normal’ Indigenous citizens will be expected to navigate mainstream 
systems and manage their own circumstances. ‘Dysfunctional’ 
Indigenous people are framed as unwilling or incapable of moderating 
the risk they impose on the whole, and on specific vulnerable others 
such as their children (Macoun 2011). Moreover, in some instances 
this risk appears as catastrophic and unpredictable. Active, successful 
settler sovereignty is necessary, not for its own sake, but in order to 
moderate Indigenous risks on their behalf. This project of priority 
intervention is conditioned by the neoliberal de-collectivisation of 
unsustainable collective colonial risk—only specific, strategic 
interventions are possible given limited state resources. When 
responsibility for colonial risk is disaggregated, the specific location of 
harms in particular sectors is more acceptable, being linked to the 
behaviours of that sector rather than belonging to the whole. 
Conclusion 
Australian Indigenous policy is undoubtedly a complex area, which 
involves many different people in relationships of genuine concern 
and engagement. However, as this article seeks to demonstrate, there 
remains an underlying attempt to manage Indigenous peoples’ threat 
to the settler state. While this management is continually changing 
and being contested, I argue that these shifts can be better 
understood as changes of strategy than as substantive rearticulations 
of the settler colonial relationship. Recent policy phases of self-
determination, neoliberalism and intervention all continue to construct 
independent Aboriginal existence as a risk to the stability of settler 
sovereignty.  
Telling the story of Australian Indigenous policy as a story of colonial 
risk management has a number of useful effects. It locates the settler 
state as a partisan and incomplete project which seeks to manage 
Indigenous political difference. It also reveals continuities in recent 
policy making, which is superficially characterised by a cycle of radical 
change. In particular, it highlights the connection between neoliberal 
contractual policy and intervention. The NTER is usually discussed 
separately from other policies and presented as an unconditioned 
eruption (with some exceptions—see Stringer 2007, I. Watson 2009). 
This article has shown that it is intimately connected with the previous 
framework; neoliberal voluntarism recodes the policy landscape in 
ways that make strategic intervention possible and necessary.  
In relation to Australian Indigenous policy, Sanderson claims that 
‘[g]overnments in liberal democratic countries have been drawn into 
the contradictory mode of divesting themselves of social and 
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infrastructure liabilities for the state, in keeping with the needs of the 
market, while taking coercive action to ensure stability and conformity’ 
(Sanderson 2007, p. 33). Risk analysis suggests that the neoliberal 
practice of divesting risk and ‘returning rule’ to capable subjects itself 
gives rise to the category of incapacity and to the coercive resumption 
of risk. Given that the state no longer spreads social risk evenly 
across the population, sites of high risk become intense and appear to 
threaten the whole. Sovereignty appears ineffective in the face of this 
intense risk, given that it has relinquished responsibility for and 
apparent direct control over social risk management. So in these 
cases, it acts performatively and comprehensively to secure these 
sites and demonstrate its ability to act as last line of defence for the 
sovereign community.   
Early on, continental risk scholar Castel identified the direction in 
which neoliberal risk management led (1991; see also Henman 2004). 
Neoliberal risk management practices identify ‘objective’ risk factors 
which expose an individual to potential harm, and ask the individual to 
act upon these factors to minimise the risk of that harm occurring. 
This gives rise to the diffuse governmental regimes of ‘active life 
management’ and preventative health control—both of which 
minimise the cost to the state while maximising security. However:  
[w]hat the new preventative policies primarily address is no longer 
individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous 
elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of intervention, 
and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk… To 
be suspected, it is no longer necessary to manifest symptoms of 
dangerousness or abnormality, it is enough to display whatever 
characteristic the specialists responsible for the definition of 
preventive policy have constituted as risk factors. (Castel 1991, p. 
288) 
In the 1970s, when Castel is writing, ‘objectivised witch-hunts’ remain 
a conceptual possibility opened up by neoliberal risk management, 
rather than a reality. However, ‘[t]he fact that there has so far been no 
politically scandalous utilization made of these possibilities is not 
enough to allow complete peace of mind’ (Castel 1991, p. 294). While 
the return to race-based regimes of coercion has taken many in 
Australia by surprise, the conditions which legitimise this ‘rule by risk 
category’ are laid much earlier. The neoliberal divestment of colonial 
risk to Indigenous subjects is one such condition.  
Elizabeth Strakosch is a postdoctoral research fellow at the 
University of Queensland, and her research explores the links 
between settler colonialism, policy, public administration and 
political community. 
                                                
Notes 
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1 Sovereign refers to ‘the troubled focus within settler colonial studies on 
structure to the erasure of indigenous experiences and perspectives about 
colonialism even within analyses of the “logic of elimination” that fuels 
colonial processes of social formation’ (2011).  
2 Beck tends to naturalise the existence of catastrophic risk, and his 
sociological work on the global risk society echoes contemporary 
authoritarian policy discourse (Culpitt 1999, p. 112; Dean 1999; O’Malley 
2009, p. 11). Rather than presenting catastrophic risk as either real or as a 
political strategy, it is more valuable to acknowledge that liberal democracies 
simultaneously experience these risks as profoundly threatening and 
mobilise them as part of political rule. Ewald, in his recent work, highlights 
this dual character:  
Since the beginning of the new millennium, advanced liberal democracies 
have faced ordeals of unexpected vulnerability, unsuspected by individuals 
in developed society, who were lulled by the promise of an ever safer 
world. We are seeing the return of disasters, the insistence on individual 
and collective injuries of unequalled magnitude… with the difference that 
disasters are no longer, as before, attributed to God or providence, but to 
human agency. (Ewald 2002, p. 282, emphasis added)  
3 Beck suggests that these global threats are real and external, calling forth 
new hierarchical responses, while post-Foucauldian accounts refer only to 
‘changing governmental conditions’ or unconditioned sovereign ‘re-eruptions’ 
(O’Malley 2009, p. 14; Dean 2007). 
4 This shift was accompanied by a number of significant legislative initiatives: 
in order to ‘fast-track development’, the Government amended the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 (Cth) (Howard-Wagner 2008). Both amendments 
involved suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), and were 
justified as responses to progressive overemphasis on Indigenous 
entitlement at the expense of economic efficiency and personal responsibility 
(Howard-Wagner 2008). 
5 In the FaCSIA 2005-06 Annual Report: SRAs: target 100, results 95. 
Holistic SRAs: target 5, results ‘none at this time, although several in 
development’. RPAs: target 5, results 1 (2006, p. 236). 
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